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Summary 
Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) has been on the ascendancy for 
several decades and plays a leading role in conservation strategies worldwide. Arriving out of 
a desire to rectify the human costs associated with coercive conservation, CBNRM sought to 
return the stewardship of biodiversity and natural resources to local communities through 
participation, empowerment and decentralisation. Today, however, scholars and practitioners 
suggest that CBNRM is experiencing a crisis of identity and purpose, with even the most 
positive examples experiencing only fleeting success due to major deficiencies. We draw on 
six case studies from around the world to offer a history of how and why the global CBNRM 
narrative has unfolded over time and space. We argue that while CBNRM emerged with 
promise and hope, it often ended in less than ideal outcomes when institutionalised and 
reconfigured in design and practice.  Nevertheless, we conclude that despite the current crisis, 
there is scope for refocusing on the original ideals of CBNRM: ensuring social justice, 
material well-being and environmental integrity.  
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1. Introduction 
The end of the Second World War saw international donors and states intensify and extend 
centralized approaches to conservation and development in much of the developing world. In 
the context of modernization and the growth of donor aid in the 1960s, developing states 
retained support for strong conservation measures often for the benefit of elites, tourism and 
conservation goals (Neumann, 2001, 2004). The morality and efficacy of coercive 
conservation was questioned by conservationists who realised that restrictions could be 
harmful to local social and material well-being, thus fuelling individual and collective 
resistance which undermined conservation objectives (West and Brechin, 1991; Brandon and 
Wells, 1992). In line with the rise of social movements and ideas around a fairer ‘international 
economic order’ in the 1970s, conservation initiatives drew on notions of participatory 
engagement, indigenous knowledge and community needs in pursuit of combined objectives 
involving social justice, poverty reduction and biodiversity conservation (Brokensha, et al., 
1980; Chambers, 1983; Fals-Borda, 1989).   
 
Increasingly managers argued that because local people already used, relied on and managed 
natural resources, they were in the best position to conserve them with external assistance.  
Placing emphasis on how local peoples’ abilities and knowledge could be tapped to make 
conservation empowering and culturally compatible, new grass-roots approaches variously 
called integrated conservation and development (ICDPs), community-based conservation 
(CBC), and community-based natural resources management (CBNRM) came to challenge 
previous practices (Berkes, 1989; Marcus, 2001; Campbell and Vainio-Mattila, 2003).  There 
were hopes that this change in paradigm would bring about more locally relevant and 
equitable forms of conservation (Kellert et al., 2000; Berkes, 2004).  Initially, then, CBNRM 
was conceived of as an incremental social process of assisting impoverished communities set 
priorities and make decisions for developing natural assets and social equality to reduce 
livelihood vulnerability and improve conservation (Berkes, 1989; Western and Wright, 1994; 
Horowitz, 1998; Berkes, 2004).  And yet, as we show, it was in this broader definition that 
conservationist ideologies and motives were often found to contradict rural ways of life across 
the globe. 
 
Almost three decades later, the ideal of CBNRM finds itself caught up in complex 
administrative and policy structures (Blaikie, 2006), perversely hybridised with wider 
neoliberal restructuring (McCarthy, 2005) and challenged by a resurgent protectionist 
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conservation (Hutton et al., 2005). Today, CBNRM is experiencing a crisis of identity and 
purpose, with even the most positive examples experiencing only fleeting success due to 
major deficiencies. We draw on six case studies from around the world to offer a critical 
history of how and why the global CBNRM narrative has unfolded over time and space. This 
is important because while CBNRM can be treated as a technical problem-solving exercise 
―‘how to conserve wildlife / habitat in rural landscapes’, it must also be analysed critically in 
order to understand what happens to these well-laid plans and good intentions. For all the 
idealism inherent in CBNRM, it is never actually ideal in practice. When CBNRM is worked 
out on the ground it must deal with various forces, movements and dynamics which can turn it 
into something quite different from what its architects imagined. However, despite CBNRM’s 
current crisis of legitimacy, there remains considerable potential for refocusing the approach 
toward its core objectives: social justice, material well-being and environmental integrity.  
 
Our aims in this paper are three: 1) to identify the origins and outcomes of CBNRM around 
the globe, 2) to demonstrate that while CBNRM ideals were never absolute, primary 
objectives have been compromised over time, and 3) to argue that the initial hope of CBNRM 
producing equitable solutions for poverty reduction and conservation can be regained with 
renewed emphasis on integrating social justice with conservation. We conclude that this will 
require placing greater emphasis on the need for more multi-level critical analysis of CBNRM 
that identifies false beliefs and practices embedded in the concept, as well as opens up 
avenues to restore hope.  
 
2. CBNRM and its discontents 
Our historical overview of CBNRM builds on two frameworks.  First, we draw on Quarles 
van Ufford et al’s (2003) analysis of three general phases or disjunctures in the post-war 
history of development: hope, politics/administration and critical understanding.  Hope refers 
to the initial hope embedded in new ideas for the future; in the case of CBNRM, the 
possibilities for a better integration between human needs and biodiversity conservation. 
Politics and administration relate to the process when ideals become caught up with 
organisational forms and relationships that devise technologies for their implementation. 
Critical understanding comes down to viewing development as a domain of knowledge 
production and diffusion, as well as a site of particular knowledge constructions about how 
the world works (Lewis and Mosse, 2006).  The point is to both recognise and account for the 
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inconsistencies between the various disjunctures and faces of CBNRM while also trying to 
bridge critical reflections on process with the dynamics of practical local solutions.   
 
Second, we draw on Brosius et al’s (2005) suggestion that, while the moral obligation to act 
may still be a part of CBNRM, motives and actions also become reconfigured as they are 
caught up in bureaucracies with competing political interests and management priorities. In 
this sense, the moral justification to act through CBNRM and its contrasting objectives 
become entangled through the processes of their own implementation by governments, NGO 
administrations, and local actors.  Increasingly, the ways in which CBNRM is “formed, 
promoted and institutionalized” arises through various levels of influence that consist of 
different values, understandings and motives that span the local and international level 
(Brosius et al., 1998: 160). The following section chronicles the significant roots, institutional 
structures and political processes that have forged the policies and practices of CBNRM 
through both local specificities and global, structural dynamics. 
 
Coercing Conservation 
The origins of CBNRM are best understood in relation to the histories of the western 
conservation model.   From 18th century and onwards, ideals of a people-free landscape for 
the purposes of leisure and consumption played an important role in defining land use in 
colonized regions of the world (Neumann, 2002; Brockington et al., 2008). While many 
reserves preceded Yellowstone as America’s first national park in 1872 (Brockington et al., 
2008), the park’s management approach of restricting local access to natural resources 
through coercion became the de facto model for most protected areas (Nash, 1967; Stevens, 
1997; Igoe, 2005).  In the post-war period, as the conservation movement began to diversify 
(through capitalist expansion) in ways that would later support the rise (and ‘fall’) of 
CBNRM, so-called ‘fortress conservation’ strongly influenced the development of protected 
areas in former colonies.  Conservation policies upheld the view that those who depended on 
resources near reserves be criminalized for what they harvested, and, where identity was 
closely tied to livelihoods, for who they were (Neumann, 1998). In some cases, resource 
dependent peoples were forcibly removed and dispossessed from lands, else suffering 
economic displacement (Brechin et al., 2002; Brockington and Igoe 2006; Dowie, 2009).  The 
‘legitimacy’ of Anglo-European scientific understandings of nature and culture were 
reproduced coercively through protected areas for decades (Brockington et al, 2008).  
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Historical Shifts to CBNRM  
In this context of inequality and human suffering, resistance and political struggle grew 
rapidly. In the 1960s, social movements, networks and programmes with emancipatory 
objectives grew in strength, pressing the conservation agencies of independent states to care 
for their citizens’ livelihoods through more inclusive approaches (Hutton et al., 2005). Critical 
scholars working on participatory approaches and conservation with indigenous peoples 
argued that conservation ultimately silenced those people who held the greatest insights into 
their own state of affairs in the name of science (Simpson, 2001; Ryan and Robinson, 1990). 
The ideology of participatory research, community development and grass-roots conservation 
soon converged to advocate that marginalized peoples harness their own experiences and 
knowledge to define priorities and enhance their capacities for action (Hall, 1981; Ryan and 
Robinson, 1990).  
 
In the 1970s - 1980s, the drive of grassroots initiatives soon pressed for community-based 
solutions to larger environmental problems (Brokensha, et al 1980; Chambers, 1983). The 
early environmental movement, powerful publications such as Carson’s Silent Spring, 
innovative academic work (Berkes, 1989), and international policy documents (Our Common 
Future, etc) all emphasised the need “to seek a new balance in the use of both ‘scientific’ and 
‘traditional management systems’” (Berkes, 1989: 3). Academics and practitioners now 
emphasised that because local people already used, relied on and managed natural resources, 
they were most suited to conserve them, though with extra-local support. They set out to work 
with local resource users and traditional management in common property systems to ensure 
conservation met local livelihood aspirations and scientific objectives (Ostrom, 1990; Western 
and Wright, 1994). NGOs and park managers adopted ‘devolved,’ ‘collective,’ and/or 
‘community-based’ natural resource management by facilitating and building on local 
interests and management capabilities to assist local peoples make decisions and develop 
resources in order to support livelihood and conservation (Western and Wright 1994, 
Wittayapak and Dearden 1999, Li, 2002; Berkes 2004).  The CBNRM agenda had been set.   
 
The 1980s to 1990s saw the scaling up, institutionalizing and merging of community and 
conservation concerns in a political/administrative framework that some consider a ‘global 
biodiversity conservation regime’ (e.g., in 1992, the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development) (Escobar, 1998).  The popularity of ‘sustainable development’ led to a rash of 
poorly conceived and rarely successful, large-scale ‘integrated conservation and development 
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projects’ (Brandon and Wells, 1992). CBNRM practitioners sought to “make nature and 
natural products meaningful to rural communities” through markets in contrast to local people 
seeing CBNRM as the means by which to regain control over natural resources for livelihood 
security and conservation (Western and Wright, 1994). CBNRM fostered intense relationships 
between local communities, conservationists and others, thereby creating and 
institutionalizing increasingly larger political disjunctures in the intent and ideal of CBNRM. 
The outcomes of this process have led to the current CBNRM predicament.  
 
3. The Shifting Ground of CBNRM at the local-global scale  
In line with our first aim, we now identify the origins and outcomes of CBNRM in different 
regions of the world. Drawing on the conceptual framework above, we also address our 
second aim of showing how the initial hope of CBNRM generating equitable solutions to 
poverty reduction and conservation has become compromised by institutional and 
bureaucratic reconfigurations. We highlight the philosophies, program designs, and local 
conditions that have driven contrasting outcomes across the globe, east to west.   
  
The Rise and Fall of CBNRM in the Philippines  
CBNRM in the Philippines arose in response to colonial conservation policy and practice that 
centered on coercion and injustice, restricting indigenous peoples’ use of forest resources.  
Despite good intentions, the case shows how CBNRM’s original objectives of local 
empowerment for rights to land, livelihood and conservation effectively supported state 
interests in sedentarized agriculture and market expansion.     
 
Much of the colonial period, from Spanish (1521-1898) to American (1902-1945) rule, 
involved the zoning of timber resources in protected areas, from which uplanders were 
evicted as squatters on public lands.  Little had changed after independence in 1945, with 
foresters criminalising the use of forest resources near park boundaries. In the 1960s and 
1970s, Dictator Ferdinand Marcos expanded his timber monopoly into forest frontiers and 
aimed to sedentarise swidden cultivators with de facto tenure and agroforestry schemes 
(Vitug, 2000; Dressler, 2006).  In 1986, the masses and civil society revolted, ousting Marcos 
during the first People Power Revolution, creating community-based solutions to social 
injustice and deforestation (Hilhorst, 2003). Constitutional recognition of ancestral land rights 
and devolution then enabled NGOs to push ahead with national anti-logging campaigns, 
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indigenous rights agendas and livelihood programs. Manila-based campaigns soon targeted 
the country’s environmental hotspots – of which Palawan Island was primary.    
 
Palawan Island’s status of ecological frontier went global in the late 1990s, drawing major 
NGO and government-led CBNRM initiatives. But CBNRM on Palawan reflected multiple 
shades of green. With a celebrity Mayor promoting a ‘clean and green’ political platform, the 
island’s capital, Puerto Princesa City, hosted organizations promoting alternative livelihoods 
for ‘forest dwellers’ in order to limit swidden agriculture.  Moreover, the buffer zones of the 
island’s flagship World Heritage Site, the Puerto Princesa Subterranean River National Park, 
hosted local and international NGOs who offered the Tagbanua and Batak —indigenous 
swidden farmers and ‘hunter-gatherers’, respectively —projects that simply re-regulated 
forest use and swidden toward sedentarization with market-based solutions (Dressler, 2006). 
 
Several cases show how ‘community-based’ practitioners sought to intensify and modify 
Tagbanua and Batak swidden-based livelihoods in Palawan. In 2007, the NGO, Tagbalay 
Foundation, set out to develop an extensive nursery with 100s of seedlings of indigenous fruit 
trees and hardwoods for planting in swidden fallows. In 2008, in partnership with the City 
Agriculturist's office, Nestle Incorporated introduced Cacao seedlings in new swidden 
fallows. In 2009, the NGO, Haribon Palawan, worked through a UNDP programme to 
implement several hectares of paddy fields for Tagbanua to harvest and sell surplus rice in 
local and city markets, providing them with high-yielding seeds and capital with which to 
enhance production.  In contrast, Batak would ‘voluntarily’ adopt agroforestry plots for 
stabilizing swiddens with tree crops for sale in markets nearby. These CBNRM projects were 
designed to have Tagbanua and Batak abandon swidden for paddy rice farming, despite 
history showing that neither group has adopted paddy rice or agroforestry with great success.     
 
Despite the promise of CBNRM, there are countless examples in the Philippines of well-
meaning, internationally funded programs being implemented under the assumption that pre-
existing subsistence livelihoods need to be sedentarized and modernized. Most of the 
country’s CBNRM programmes and projects have been implemented under the broader 
assumption of how rural people and livelihoods should be or become over time: productive 
citizens who embrace modernity. The ability of CBNRM planners to modernize has arisen 
through the process of criminalizing, erasing and replacing earlier land uses with commercial 
agriculture.  
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Nepalese community forestry: who wins, who loses?  
CBNRM arose in Nepal through forest policies developed and implemented by state forestry 
agencies.  The case demonstrates how well intentioned community-forestry policies and 
projects did support ‘collective’ afforestation, but ultimately emboldened local elites 
politically and financially.  
 
Early forest policies emphasised ‘efficient’ economic forest management for maximizing 
revenue, leading to conservation outcomes that disadvantaged minority groups (Shrestha and 
McManus, 2008). In 1957, state efforts to nationalise private forest holdings ensured most 
forestlands were under centralized government control.  Since the mid-1970s, however, 
increased pressure for more democratic governance, decentralisation and bottom-up planning 
has emphasized the need to work through pre-existing local Panchayats or Village Councils 
to involve local people in forest management.  Against this background, the Community 
forestry (CF) policy emerged in 1976 because of the failure to halt deforestation and the need 
for policies that were responsive to local needs and indigenous resource use. This change 
represented a paradigm shift from the state controlled policies to user based decentralized 
control policies (Gilmour and Fisher, 1991). Radical as these changes may be, it remains to be 
seen whether there is sufficient political will to change a centrist bureaucratic culture and 
practice toward a locally driven forest management model.   
 
In the case of Nepalese CF, highly degraded forests have been significantly improved through 
voluntary labour provided by community groups (Shrestha and McManus, 2008).  Legally, all 
forest users must follow local management rules which aim to minimize forest use and ensure 
forest conservation. However, local elites set the rules and, unlike the poor and minorities, 
they depend less on community forests for their livelihoods.  Local elites have few difficulties 
implementing protection-oriented management approaches for the simple reasons that they 
are 1) supported by the state forest officials and international donor agencies (DANIDA, 
USAID and AUSAID) and 2) that protectionist rules are, in this case, easier to enforce than 
complex rules regulating the sustainable use of forests (Shrestha and McManus, 2007). This 
has resulted in the underutilization of forests and reduced the flow of forest products to the 
local poor and minorities.  
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The shift towards CBNRM in Nepal has largely failed to strike a reasonable balance between 
the conservation of forests and the socio-economic needs of forest dependent poor people. 
This can be attributed to the protection-oriented management practices promoted by state 
officials and many conservation organisations. The irony is that the poor have been made 
worse off under CF and lost much of their local autonomy to vested interests.  
 
Madagascar: CBNRM for and by outsiders  
CBNRM initiatives in Madagascar have been pushed and organized by foreigners together 
with a cadre of Malagasy bureaucrats and scientists. As above, we see how in this case, 
CBNRM grew within a complex ‘conservation bureaucracy’, spanning colonial to post-
colonial initiatives, which all limited local resource use practices.    
 
‘Official’ nature conservation in Madagascar was first instigated by the French colonial 
government, which restricted forest clearance and fire-setting by locals, and established the 
first nature reserves in the 1920s. Conservation efforts in this ‘biodiversity hotspot’ boomed 
from the late 1980s, when the World Bank, WWF, and various bilateral aid programs 
partnered with the Malagasy government to propose a massive National Environmental 
Action Plan (NEAP).  Implemented from 1991 to 2008, the three-phase NEAP received 
almost half a billion dollars US in cumulative funding (Hufty & Muttenzer 2002; Pollini 
2007).   
 
The NEAP’s second phase, responding to international trends, emphasised community-based 
resource management. The approach was developed by French, American, and Malagasy 
scholar-practitioners heavily inspired by the common property tradition (Berkes 1989; Weber 
1995).  The resulting 1996 legislation, known as ‘GELOSE’ (Gestion Locale Sécurisée - 
secure local management), allows the granting of management rights over specific natural 
resources to community associations. These associations enter into a contract with the local 
municipality and the relevant government ministry. Implementation of GELOSE requires the 
creation and registration of community associations, the assessment and delimitation of the 
resource, and the use of a specially-trained ‘environmental mediator’ to negotiate the 
contracts (Antona et al. 2004). In addition, a problematic and infrequently-used ‘relative’ land 
tenure process facilitates zoning the resource involved, but not actual titling (Le Roy et al. 
2006). Given this complexity, GELOSE contracts have always been created through the 
initiative and guidance of NGOs and projects, usually foreign-funded.   
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For some practitioners, GELOSE was too cumbersome.  As a result, they developed a simpler 
alternative, called GCF (Gestion Contractualisée des Forêts - forest management contracts), 
by decree in 2001 (Montagne & Ramamonjisoa 2006). Unlike GELOSE, it requires neither 
tenure allocation, mediation, nor negotiation with the municipality. However, it can only be 
applied to state forest lands, like reserved or classified forests. At one point, the competing 
GELOSE and GCF approaches became emblematic of rivalries between different donors and 
NGOs.  
 
In 2003, spurred by conservationists, President Ravalomanana announced that the country 
would triple the size of its protected area network in five years. This ‘conservation 
emergency’ (Marie et al. 2009), subsequently overrode any meaningful community 
engagement (Pollini 2007; Corson 2008). Various NGOs continued developing new GCF and 
GELOSE contracts, but this took place in the spirit of Ravalomanana’s ambitious – and not 
very participatory – program for high-speed economic development and urgent conservation. 
Over 450 local management contracts have been established in this time. Evaluations point to 
both successes and failures. Concerns have been raised over longer-term sustainability. Others 
point to problems with non-representative community associations, with elites that get control 
of the resources, or with new resource conflicts engendered by the contracts (Montagne et al. 
2007; Pollini 2007; Toillier et al. 2008). 
 
The conception and implementation of CBNRM in Madagascar is top-down, driven by well-
funded foreign conservation and development agencies and centralized bureaucracies. Rural 
civil society is weak and the state has little capacity or legitimacy to implement decisions. 
Consequently, outsiders control the agenda (Duffy 2006). While there is hope that the well-
meaning CBNRM experiment will take hold and lead to a trend of communities taking 
meaningful control of their resources, its dependency on outside intervention leads to 
pessimism about its sustainability.  
 
CBNRM in Southern Africa: from Inspiration to Ambiguity  
CBNRM programs emerged in southern Africa in the early 1980s in response to the strictures 
of Apartheid and neo-colonial governance limiting rural people’s civil liberties and rights to 
natural resources. This case shows, however, that the enormous hope vested in CBNRM in the 
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region was paralleled by equally ambiguous outcomes through market-based structures and 
political/administrative realities that ultimately led to its demise today.  
 
In the context of an increasingly isolated South African Apartheid state in the 1980s, tensions 
between countries in the region ran high and multiple initiatives countering top-down neo-
colonial governance and policies developed.  In some ways, early CBNRM ran as a counter-
hegemonic program aiming to stimulate local ownership and devolution of decision-making 
power (Mackenzie, 1988). Initial forays began in Zimbabwe in the 1980s through 
CAMPFIRE, with parallel programs emerging in Namibia, Zambia, and Botswana (Marks, 
2008). These initiatives focused on providing benefits to local communities through a 
utilitarian approach to wildlife. Individually and collectively these efforts rose to prominence 
during the 1990s, exciting many in the global conservation and development community.  
 
While advocates loudly proclaimed their successes, actual results were mixed (Fabricius et al, 
2004). CAMPFIRE, the shining star of the CBNRM world, struggled to devolve benefits to 
local resource users (see Murphree, 2004).  While some Zimbabwean districts did profit from 
income at household level, in others local elite reaped the rewards or overall income simply 
was not enough to provide tangible benefits to local people. Meanwhile, Namibia had some 
success by focusing on the development of community conservancies which sought to create 
ecotourism opportunities in marginal grazing lands. The market-based approach of the 
conservancies appears to have provided more tangible benefits to local people in the context 
of Namibia’s low human population, marginal rangelands, high levels of biodiversity, and 
strong ecotourism interest than the alternatives (Barnes and Macgregor, 2002). The 
exceptional nature of the Namibian case, however, is counterbalanced by experiences in 
Zambia:  
“there appears to be little within Zambian wildlife history or current circumstances that support ADMADE’s 
promotional claims to enhance rural welfare while promoting “sustainable conservation” within the central 
Luangwa Valley. Rather its practices and approaches appear counterproductive to both objectives” (Marks, 
2008: 3).  
.  
In 1994, when South Africa ended Apartheid, the regional CBNRM picture changed rapidly.  
Initially, it seemed that the conservation community and the newly elected government 
combined to push for more people-oriented conservation policies and programs. In some 
areas, such as the Eastern Cape and Limpopo Provinces, communities managed to use the 
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CBNRM rhetoric to legitimate claims over land.  However, CBNRM never emerged in South 
Africa to the extent of its neighbours. This was partly due to the prominence of the 
conservation structures already in place. Built around protected areas, this structure was 
subjected to land restitution claims after 1994, in a drive to restore land ownership to 
‘previously disadvantaged’ groups and communities. Yet, despite some successes (Fabricius 
and de Wet 2002), including the famous case of the Makuleke community owning the 
northern part of the Kruger National Park, the old system proved resilient.  In early 2009, the 
South African government announced that with respect to the Kruger Park, all remaining 
claims were annulled and other solutions for making communities profit from the park to be 
found. 
 
By the late 1990s, critics identified shortcomings of CBNRM, including problems with 
benefit sharing, the frequent mismatch between the goals of the state and communities, and 
the weakening of local commonage institutions so vital for CBNRM (see Cocks et al., 2001 
for the case of the Masakane community in the Eastern Cape Province).  As a result, funding 
for CBNRM steadily decreased, partly as more money went toward transboundary 
conservation, but especially in support of market-based mechanisms that sought to support   
public-private-community schemes. The importance of CBNRM in Southern Africa stems 
mainly from the influence that it had globally. Its primary success in instilling hope that 
integrating conservation and development might succeed, however, should be balanced by 
noting that the few successes have been increasingly undermined by broader neoliberal 
barriers of socio-economic differentiation. 
 
CBNRM and the BOSAWAS Reserve, Nicaragua: merging common interests?  
The CBNRM process that evolved in Bosawas illustrates how external organizations may 
play a critical role in ensuring indigenous peoples’ land and resource rights when resident 
land use interests are in conjunction with conservation goals. The case also illustrates that the 
promotion of resource rights, empowerment and sustained environmental governance requires 
political, technical and financial support that extends longer than the time frames of many 
CBNRM projects.  
 
Bosawas International Biosphere Reserve is located in remote northern Nicaragua and is part 
of a set of protected areas created to conserve remnant regional humid tropical forests. In 
1991, newly elected President Chamorro created Bosawas as a nature reserve in order to 
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prevent mining and logging in the region (Stocks 2003). At this time, the civil war had 
recently ended and politicians, indigenous residents (mainly Miskito and Mayagnas), and 
colonists were fighting to control resources in the region. During the war, many indigenous 
peoples in Bosawas were either forced to serve one of the militant groups or removed to 
camps in Nicaragua and Honduras. When the residents returned to their communities after the 
war they found that their homelands were now a forest reserve under government jurisdiction, 
and colonized by many farmers and ex-combatants (Stocks 1996). 
 
In protest against the reserve and colonization, the indigenous peoples of south-western 
Bosawas joined forces to create a unified political organization to advocate for their land 
rights. Shortly thereafter, leaders gained the support of Centro Humboldt (a Managua-based 
NGO ) and The Nature Conservancy (TNC) to help establish their land rights while creating a 
CBNRM plan for the region. TNC took a unique approach in implementing CBNRM in 
Bosawas. Rather than beginning with conservation interests, TNC first addressed the concerns 
of the indigenous residents; namely, securing territorial tenure and preventing settler 
colonization. The NGOs worked with the indigenous residents to demarcate their territories, 
create CBNRM plans, and ultimately, demand formal land rights from the Nicaraguan 
government (Stocks 2003; Hayes 2007). In 1997, the indigenous residents signed an accord 
with the colonists creating a de facto community based land use plan for the region, and in 
2005, the indigenous residents received legal collective titles to their territories, turning a 
government reserve into an indigenous reserve.    
 
Given clear territorial demarcation and resource management plans, the indigenous residents 
have conserved the forests and prevented further colonization in the region (Hayes 2007; 
Stocks et al. 2007). Residents and leaders express great pride in their ability to defend their 
territory from colonists and manage their lands. The indigenous peoples’ ownership of the 
process points to a key ingredient in the success of Bosawas: residents believe that the 
CBNRM system is their own creation. Nonetheless, the role of NGOs in the CBNRM process 
has proven equally significant.  
 
Analysis of the resource management process in Bosawas points to three lessons and a critical 
concern for the role of external organizations in implementing CBNRM.  The first lesson is 
the importance of supporting residents’ needs rather than structuring the management process 
around a conservation agenda.  In Bosawas, by recognizing the residents’ demands, the NGOs 
 15
gained the residents’ trust and facilitated the creation of a set of natural resource management 
plans that were perceived to be legitimate by both indigenous residents and the colonists 
(Hayes 2008). Second, the case highlights the technical, financial, and organizational costs 
involved in rulemaking and the role that external agencies may play in covering these costs. 
The NGOs also provided the technical and financial resources necessary for demarcating the 
territories, acquiring territorial titles, and training and paying the forest guards.  
 
Finally, the case illustrates the costs involved in rule maintenance. The continued dependency 
on external assistance points to a critical caveat. CBNRM in Bosawas demands sustained 
financial, institutional and technical support from extra-local sources. Centro Humboldt 
continues to play a significant role in the region by providing administrative and institutional 
support. Their presence also serves as a watchdog to ensure compliance with the land-use 
rules (Hayes 2008). A concern for the future, however, is if and how support for this 
governance system will be generated on a sustainable basis. 
 
CBNRM in North America 
CBNRM in North America has often taken the form of community forestry programs and 
projects.  These programs spread rapidly throughout North America over the past two decades 
as part of the global dissemination of community forestry as an alternative to fortress 
conservation and centralized state control over natural resources.  This case shows how, 
despite much promise, community forestry has also been subject to a litany of complaints 
including, that its establishment violated the rights of local and indigenous populations and 
that it has emphasized primary commodity production and export at the expense of social and 
environmental considerations. 
 
While forms of community forestry are pursued at multiple juridical levels in every country in 
North America (see, e.g., Baker and Kusel 2003; Bray et al., 2005; Davis, 2008), we focus on 
community forestry on large state-owned ‘National Forests’ in the United States and ‘Crown 
forests’ in Canada. National and Crown forests represent extensive areas of natural resources 
directly owned and administered by the state. As such, they have much in common with each 
other and other areas in world that have turned to CBNRM in response to colonial encounters, 
competing claims and scientific assumptions of best practice.      
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Many critics of forest governance in both countries saw community forestry as the basis to  
recognize and privilege local rights, knowledge, and priorities and, by so doing, balance and 
improve social, economic, and environmental performance. Calls for community forestry thus 
grew in both countries during the 1980s and into the 1990s, with strong and explicit linkages 
to global trends in community forestry. In both the USA and Canada, proponents of 
community forestry drew from the growing international discourse on community forestry 
when they made their cases regarding its potential.  
 
Efforts to implement community forestry on large public forests met very different fates in the 
two countries. In Canada, new community forest tenure categories emerged within forest 
management systems, giving control over large areas to different community forestry 
organizations, with indigenous First Nations, environmentalists, cooperatives, municipal 
governments, and other actors all beginning to operate community forests (see McCarthy, 
2006; Bullock and Hanna, 2008).1 In the United States, however, efforts to carve out space for 
community forests within the National Forest system generated fierce controversy, with most 
major environmental organizations opposing and successfully blocking the efforts (McCarthy 
2005). The controversies were both juridical and substantive. Juridically, opponents argued 
that community forestry was incompatible with key federal environmental legislation, which 
demanded strong and consistent environmental standards and federal accountability. The 
substantive fear behind the opposition was that the devolution and more flexible regulation 
associated with community forestry would be a Trojan horse for increased corporate access 
and logging, a fear lent weight by the fact that conservative, anti-environmental politicians 
strongly supported community forestry in the United States in the 1990s. Environmentalists 
thus gave voice to the critical concern that community forestry was perhaps suspiciously 
compatible with broader trends in the neoliberalization of governance:  it  shared a deep 
scepticism regarding state control; a faith in markets, devolution, and voluntary and flexible 
approaches to regulation; and a strong conviction that civil society, or its communities, were 
best suited to address any market failures or inequities (see McCarthy, 2005; Schroeder, 
1999).  
 
                                                 
1 As of April 2009, 33 community forests were managing approximately 900,000 hectares of Crown forests in 
British Columbia alone, with 18 more community forest tenure applications in process (BC Ministry of Forests, 
http://www.for.gov.bc.ca/hth/community/, accessed July 24, 2009). 
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McCarthy (2006) interprets this divergent outcome as primarily a matter of scale and timing, 
reflecting broader trends in environmental governance. While the critiques of the dominant 
model of forest governance and use were similar in the USA and Canada, the political 
momentum for reform peaked at very different times in the two countries, and in each case, 
the responses reflected the prevailing wisdom of the period. Demands for reform of the 
National Forest system in the United States peaked during the 1970s, and the reforms 
instituted as a result reflected that period:  all centred on the state and strengthened agencies 
and regulation, particularly a centralized, federal system of forest governance.  Subsequent 
decades saw environmental politics move increasingly to the arena of the courts and the 
adversarial strategies they demanded. Environmentalists thus saw community forestry as a 
direct attack on hard-won environmental reforms of state institutions. In Canada, by contrast, 
political momentum for reform of forest governance did not peak until the 1990s, by which 
time the shortcomings of the above approach were fully evident, and neoliberal hegemony 
with respect to questions of governance had arguably taken hold. Thus, the reforms adopted 
largely eschewed state-centred approaches, and focused instead on flexible and voluntary 
approaches, with substantial deference and autonomy for market actors and communities. 
Moreover, governance of Crown forest occurs mostly at the provincial level, allowing for a 
more varied institutional landscape.  
 
In sum, the adoption or non-adoption of community forestry often seems to have less to do 
with the specific content of programs or governance, than with questions of what community 
forestry would replace, and with larger trends in governance.  
 
4. DISCUSSION:  The CBNRM crisis? 
In the cases, it is clear that community members have drawn on CBNRM to create new 
political openings through which to articulate rights over land and resources. Yet the ability of 
local people to use these opportunities has varied in different places and regions of the world.  
On the one hand, CBNRM has partly ensured that resource dependent people have their 
relative rights and responsibilities to govern natural resources recognized by neighbours, civil 
society and the state, and, on the other, it has produced devolved approaches that have, by 
privileging conservation, facilitated community disempowerment and impoverishment. First, 
in the Bosawas Reserve case in Nicaragua, we find scholars and NGOs working with 
indigenous peoples to have them identify needs and concerns as the basis for defining and 
managing ancestral territory to maintain forests and forest-based livelihoods. We see how 
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these indigenous peoples worked through an organization that enabled them to govern with 
degrees of political autonomy, articulating their rights to secure tenure to resist settler 
colonization.  However, the case also shows that the interests of TNC and local indigenous 
peoples may have been aligned because it provided the best way for TNC to safeguard 
biodiversity from colonists. Yet, despite the opportunistic merging of local interests with 
TNC’s protectionist programme, by first starting with local needs rather than conservation 
priorities, the process and outcomes paralleled the ‘expected’ results of externally supported, 
collective decision-making structures (cf. Berkes 1989, Western and Wright 1994).   
 
Second, we see a different picture emerging in several of the cases, where, CBNRM’s 
governance design and delivery has often disempowered the very people it was meant to 
support. In the South African, Malagasy, and Philippine cases we see how state and NGO-led 
CBNRM followed foreign ideas and concepts, governing to curb local peoples’ use of natural 
resources for biodiversity conservation. In the Nepal case too, while ‘voluntary’ local action 
helped restore degraded forests, most CBNRM benefits flowed back to powerful community 
members. In contrast, the Philippine case illustrates how state actors have hybridized 
environmental discourse with CBNRM in order to prop up political campaigns, secure 
monies, and manage resources according to green political visions. The processes by which 
CBNRM has been reconfigured further influenced why some indigenous farmers adopted 
green political discourse to manage their resources on the condition of sustainability. Yet, 
certain literature also shows how CBNRM can serve as an effective avenue for people to 
assert rights to lands directly against the growing pressure to conserve biodiversity (Stevens, 
1997; Igoe, 2005). Rather than support community-based conservation, indigenous peoples 
have furthered their cause by rearticulating meta-narratives of indigeneity, cultural autonomy, 
and environmentalism through CBNRM (see Conklin and Graham, 1995).  
  
In the literature and our cases, one also sees how the surge in protectionism has sidelined 
CBNRM or worked through it to ensure preservation takes precedence over indigenous 
peoples’ demands over natural resources (see Wilshusen et al, 2002; Hutton et al, 2005). 
Rather than aiming to displace the international CBNRM agenda, neoprotectionists worked 
further to align devolved conservation with market-oriented solutions (cash cropping, 
intensification etc).  Contrary to popular perception, in the process of integrating market-
based approaches with CBNRM, the tendency for devolved conservation to become 
hybridized and bureaucratized has grown considerably (Igoe and Brockington, 2007). Indeed, 
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the Southern African and Philippine cases show how CBNRM became aligned with market-
based solutions, strengthening rather than weakening the hegemonic interests of the state.  In 
the North American context, we see how environmental activists feared that community 
forestry initiatives would become ‘compatible with broader trends in the neoliberalisation of 
governance’, such that initiatives might become increasingly aligned with ‘neoliberal market 
orthodoxy’.  Studies have shown that as CBNRM becomes entangled in and hybridized with 
(inter)national bureaucracies and neoliberalism, conservation governs local resource use 
behaviour in line with commodity markets (McCarthy, 2005).  
 
Finally, most cases have shown that reconfiguring and standardizing program policies and 
practices leads to interventions that are misaligned with local realities (Mosse, 2005; Blaikie, 
2006). The Madagascar case, in particular, shows how major international donors and 
bilateral aid programs promoted CBNRM according to international trends. In line with 
common property theory, the resulting GELOSE legislation required structured, tripartite 
partnerships between government agencies, municipalities, and community actors who were 
to manage resources through ‘registered community associations’. International donors, 
government, and practitioners then advocated for more streamlined and predefined policy 
prescriptions going under the name of ‘forest management contracts’, which offered local 
people no new rights to resources, or support for existing tenurial structures. With an outside 
push, local people have begun to take part in CBNRM governance bureaucracies, which set 
out overly organized, and neither necessarily legitimate nor long-term sustainable, solutions to 
fluid, politically contested problems.   
 
Literature suggests that CBNRM has been reconfigured as a predefined policy prescription, 
which guides planners to know problems and how to solve them even before implementation 
(Blaikie, 2006). Some suggest CBNRM serves the pragmatic purpose of achieving 
conservation efficiently by pre-identifying and framing problems rather than working through, 
and understanding the origins of, local needs and concerns (Cooke and Kothari 2001). 
Drawing on dominant understandings of the ideal relationship between culture and nature 
(e.g., traditional and sustainable), practitioners often reproduce these very same ideals and 
sentiments through CBNRM. In doing so, they identify and produce problems that the agenda 
of many devolved hybrid approaches are already known to solve by design. In the CBNRM 
bureaucracy, state and NGOs achieve this by rendering livelihood problems as concrete with 
pre-assigned solutions that involve greater market integration and intensification (see Pagiola 
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et al., 2005 on ‘payment for ecosystem services’). Those charged with community-based 
design and practice have begun simplifying problems in order to offer clear solutions already 
aligned with the expert cultures of management bureaucracies. The process by which 
practitioners identify livelihoods problems and solutions has thus become a technical exercise 
with expected political economic outcomes rather than an exercise in genuine hope for 
empowerment through conservation (Li, 2007; West, 2007). Critical scholars now argue that 
the design and implementation of CBNRM has less to do with the hope of engaging the 
complex issues of social inequity and sustainability than with measureable, transferable and 
repeatable outcomes often divorced from local peoples’ reality.  
  
Our cases show how CBNRM arose as a powerful ideal with promise only to become a near 
universal strategy for actors to render otherwise complex problems into manageable solutions.  
In the process of moving from being a diverse grass roots practice unfolding in specific social 
and environmental contexts, where funds were low but perspective was clear, to being scaled 
up as a global, pre-packaged solution to local problems, CBNRM’s near universality may lead 
to its demise.  Yet this is to be expected.  Conceptually harmonious and substantive practices 
almost always lose focus once they are “adopted, developed, circulated and promoted within 
specific organizations and beyond them, in global and local circulations” (Brosius et al., 1998: 
160). While the ‘morality of doing’ may remain, motives, actions and hope become 
reconfigured as they are caught up in bureaucratic entanglements, discourses and local 
complexities (Quarles van Ufford et al, 2003)  
  
5. Conclusion: regaining hope? 
But can CBNRM move from hope to crisis and back again? Is it possible to stimulate a 
renewed emphasis on integrating social justice with conservation? While, in principle, there is 
no reason why actors could not revitalise the hope embedded in the early history of CBNRM, 
it is also obvious that hope for a better future cannot be separated from the other political and 
economic dynamics of this same history. An assessment for the future, therefore, can only 
start from an awareness of historical and contemporary trends, which, as we have shown, do 
not bode well for CBNRM.  CBNRM has recently done less to support indigenous rights to 
land and biodiversity than it has to facilitate interventions which offer livelihood designs that 
align with free market principles. The process of adding new schemes to ‘improve’ local 
conditions opens the flood gates to donor driven ideals and incentives for livelihood change 
and economic opportunities rooted in neoliberal production. CBNRM has thus become partly 
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reconstituted in terms of market-based solutions, adding layers of governance that simply 
complicate ‘being poor’.    
 
The ways in which CBNRM ideals and intent become incorporated and reconfigured through 
bureaucracies and other institutions will only increase in the near future.  We have shown that 
this hampers the ability of practitioners to use CBNRM to provide meaningful outcomes for 
local peoples and the resources upon which they depend.  There are, however, ways to 
rekindle the original hope embedded in CBNRM.  One important avenue is for planners and 
practitioners to privilege social and environmental justice (e.g., individual and communal 
rights) over neoliberal logic.  In line with the pragmatism of CBNRM, this means ensuring 
that social inequity be redressed by identifying ways (with and) for marginal people to access, 
use and control locally valued natural resources with senses of entitlement and political 
empowerment that also support conservation (Johnson and Forsyth, 2002).  We make this 
bold assertion because it is only by explicitly restoring these core values of social equity and 
justice over neoliberal values that CBNRM can hope to resist the debilitating forces of 
bureaucratic intervention, donor-driven ideologies and economic logics that we have seen 
become so disruptive in case studies around the world.  
 
Our call is much in line with the IUCN’s, whose vision is for ‘a just world which values and 
conserves nature’. However this ideological stance is only realistic if married with a basic 
political savvy. Strengthening CBNRM’s local ‘linkages’ depends on whether interventions 
recognize and strategically deal with the wider political economic dynamics that constrain and 
influence local ‘CBNRM spaces’ (i.e., political organization, customary lands, etc).  The 
potential for particular CBNRM schemes to achieve their goals will depend on planners 
reflecting on how and why they design CBNRM relative to their organizational mandates, 
state and private sector motives, and, more crucially, the needs and concerns of local people 
in changing environments. Such CBNRM is fluid in design, relative in practice, and upheld 
with degrees of success rather than predesigned, absolute outcomes.  Degrees of success are 
achievable when ideas and designs are held relative to varying local conditions, and nested in 
livelihood practices and ideals, familial relations, tenurial structures, political economy and 
strong organizational capacity and support. 
 
We argue therefore that some of the core values of CBNRM be brought back to the fore in 
both discourse and action: ensuring social justice, supporting material well-being and 
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stimulating environmental integrity relative to local conditions and context. The prospect of 
local people sustaining CBNRM for social justice, livelihood security and conservation needs 
is centered on how well programs are embedded in socio-cultural relations, politics, resource 
needs and uses, and landscape changes.   
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